Ellery Bruce Summer v. Mary Paige Summer : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Ellery Bruce Summer v. Mary Paige Summer : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary A. Buhler; Attorney for Appellee.
Jay L. Kessler; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Summer v. Summer, No. 20101004 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2673
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
MARY PAIGE SUMMER 
Respondent/Appellee 
Appellate Court No. 20101004-CA 
Trial Court No. 084300208 DA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
This is an appeal from the Divorce Decree entered on November 15, 2010 by 
the Honorable Judge Stephen L. Henriod, Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, 
Utah, 
Jay Kessler 
9087 West 2700 South Suite 9 
Magna UT 84044 
Gary Buhler #7039 
P.O. Box 229 
Grantsville, Utah 84029-0229 
Telephone: (435) 884-0354 
FAX: (435) 884-6509 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant Attorney for Respondent /Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 0 2 2011 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLERY BRUCE SUMMER 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
MARY PAIGE SUMMER 
Respondent/Appellee 
Appellate Court No. 20101004-CA 
Trial Court No. 084300208 DA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
This is an appeal from the Divorce Decree entered on November 15, 2010 by 
the Honorable Judge Stephen L. Henriod, Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, 
Utah, 
Jay Kessler 
9087 West 2700 South Suite 9 
Magna UT 84044 
Gary Buhler #7039 
P.O. Box 229 
Grantsville, Utah 84029-0229 
Telephone: (435) 884-0354 
FAX: (435) 884-6509 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant Attorney for Respondent /Appellee 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities 2 
Jurisdictional Statement 3 
Statement of Issues 3 
Statement of the Case 3 
Summary of Argument 5 
Argument 6 
Conclusion 15 
Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs 15 
Signature of Counsel of Record 16 
Mailing Certificate 16 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Beesley v. Harris (In re Estate ofBeesley), 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994 6 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 987-91 (Utah 1988) 13 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 12 
Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 at 481 (Utah App. 1991; 6 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, U 11, 176P.3d476 11, 15 
Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921) 12 
Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1166-67 14 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) 12 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103 3 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-302 (2008) 14 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 10 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The trial court properly held Ellery Summer in contempt on more than one 
occasion and for more than one contemptuous action (Trial Record Page 22). 
2. The trial court properly awarded Ellery's share of the equity in the marital home to 
Mary Page in lieu of alimony or other marital support (TR PG 22). 
3. The trial court properly awarded Mary Page the attorney's fees generated in 
several hearings that were each necessitated by Ellery's continuing recalcitrance 
(TRPG23). 
4. Ellery has no standing to challenge the trial court's refusal to find Mary Page in 
contempt, just because he demanded such rulings. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ellery and Mary Page Summer were married for about 28 years. Prior to this 
marriage, each party had children born to them and then divorced their former 
spouses. After the marriage, the parties had a child together who is now a dependant 
adult child. During the marriage, Mary Page was mostly a stay-at-home mother to the 
parties' children. Towards the end of the marriage, Ellery retired and began to receive 
retirement benefits. 
Once the parties separated, Ellery moved to Idaho to live with one of his adult 
children. Ellery has not been employed since he retired. 
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During the several hearings leading to the trial and during the trial, Ellery 
steadfastly maintained that Mary Page should receive nothing from the divorce action 
because everything he and Mary Page had accumulated over the prior years belonged 
solely to him. At the conclusion of the trial, the court made an equitable division of the 
assets between Ellery and Mary Page, having discarded Ellery's unsupported 
argument that he should pay nothing to his wife of 28 years. 
In that order of September 2010, Ellery was ordered to pay a $1,000.00 fine, to 
provide Mary Page with a deed to the marital home, and to provide her with a QDRO 
concerning his retirement account. As of this date, Ellery has complied with none of 
these three orders. 
Although Mary Page was awarded a share of Ellery's retirement benefits in the 
divorce decree and even though Ellery and his attorney of record were both ordered to 
provide to Mary Page a QDRO or similar order to insure she would receive her share 
of the retirement benefits, as of this date, no QDRO has ever been provided to Mary 
Page. 
Likewise, even though Ellery and his attorney were both ordered to provide 
Mary Page with a Quitclaim deed to the marital home executed by Ellery, as of this 
date, no deed has ever been provided to Mary Page. 
Therefore, Ellery continues to refuse to abide the trial court's Orders and he 
now appears before this Court with unclean hands and his appeal should be 
dismissed summarily. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ellery Summer brought before this Court four issues for review claiming that the 
trial court used insufficient evidence as the basis of its findings (1) that he was in 
contempt of the existing court orders; (2) made an inequitable distribution of marital 
property; and (3) improperly awarded attorney's fees to Mary Page Summer. Then 
without any proper standing, Ellery Summer complains to this Court because the trial 
court refused to hold Mary Page in contempt, as he had wanted it to happen. 
Throughout his appellant's brief, Ellery failed to make any measurable attempt 
to marshal the evidence that is readily available in the record of the several hearings 
and the trial. Conversely, Mary Page has provided to this Court many references to 
the record wherein substantial evidence exists to defeat Ellery's un-marshaled claims 
of errors by referring the Court to the facts developed during the trial on those issues. 
Over the last four years, Ellery did not complain that his ex-wife, after raising 
his children and 28 years of marriage, received no alimony award based upon his lack 
of current income. Ellery did however repeatedly demand throughout the trial process 
that Mary Page receive no portion of the assets accumulated during the parties' 
marriage based upon various reasons, such as she withdrew less than $500 from their 
joint bank account when he refused to support her any longer. 
Over the last four years, Ellery was dishonest and evasive throughout the 
divorce proceedings and the trial court found his sworn testimony concerning his 
financial condition to be not credible (TR PG 22). 
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In sum, Ellery came to this appeal with completely unclean hands while forcing 
Mary Page to expend significant resources that she does not currently possess in 
responding to Ellery's continuous campaign to keep her living under his control. 
Mary Page asks this Court, based upon her history of prevailing in each action 
below, to allow her to recover both the award of fees she received from the trial court 
and the fees she has incurred in responding to this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I . ELLERY SUMMER WAS CONTEMPTUOUS OF THE COURTS ORDERS. 
"On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the trial court's 
decision to 'marshal' the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 at 481 (Utah App. 1991J (citing Myers v. Myers, 768 
P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1989). 
"[P]arties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing 
court will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings." Beesley v. 
Harris (In re Estate of Beesley), 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). 
In his Brief, Ellery has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous, citing 
instead only to the carefully selected evidence from the trial that supports the outcome 
he desires. 
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On page 19 of his brief, Ellery actually admits he did nothing to marshal the 
evidence on this issue when he states "Because the Order came after the insurance 
was cancelled on the Respondent There is nothing to marshal regarding that point" 
However, despite Ellery's claims, the record is replete with facts supporting the 
findings of contempt against him. When Ellery was questioned about the medical 
insurance Mary Page had at the time of trial not being what she had when the parties 
separated, Ellery admitted that she did not have any medical insurance because he 
did not have the money to pay for her medical insurance premiums, but that at the 
same time, he did have the money to make his truck payment, his credit card 
payments, to make the second mortgage payments and in fact to make every 
payment on the Temporary Order except Mary Page's medical insurance premium. 
(TR 249 PG 39, LN 8-25). 
The history of this issue is that in June 2008, Ellery was ordered to pay all 
insurance policies existing at the time of the parties separation to include Mary Page's 
Medial insurance (TR 241 PG 15, LN 19-25). 
In November 2008, the court certified the issues of Ellery's contempt for not 
paying Mary Pages' medical insurance and the issue of her attorney's fees. At that 
time, Ellery represented to the Court that the policy could be reinstated and the court 
ordered the parties to make their best efforts to do so (TR 242 PG 8, LN 14-25). 
In February 2009, the evidentiary hearing concerning Ellery's contempt was 
held at which time Ellery became uncooperative with the court to the point the Judge 
ask him if he wanted "to spend the rest of the day in the holding cell, or the rest of the 
month?" (TR 243 PG 15 LN 8-24). 
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After receiving evidence that Ellery knew of the Order, but did not agree with it, 
and receiving evidence that for the previous 11 months Ellery had been able to pay 
every other marital bill listed in the Order of Temporary Relief except for Mary Page's 
medical insurance premiums, the court found Ellery in contempt and sentenced him to 
30 days confinement and a $1,000.00 fine (TR 243 PG 33 LN 1-4). 
After counsel met with the Judge, the Court released Ellery from the holding 
facility after a few minutes, with Ellery's pledge that he would "add Mrs. Summer back 
into the PEHP medical insurance program" and the requirement that he obey all court 
orders (TR 243 PG 35 LN 1-22). 
On June 8, 2009, Ellery was once again before the court concerning several 
issues to include his continuing failure to pay for Mary Page's medical insurance. The 
Court again found him in contempt because he had been ordered to reinstate the 
health insurance and pay the utilities but he had not paid the utilities and he had not 
paid any premium necessary to reinstate the health insurance, although he had paid 
the mortgage and the credit cards that he chose to pay. 
The Court found Mr. Summer in contempt of court and he was given another 30 
days in jail for contempt for a total of 60 days jail time. The Court ordered Mr. 
Summer to serve 24 hours of the 60 days in jail, which he did, being released on June 
9,2009. (TRPG 104). 
In September, 2009, the Court ordered Ellery and his attorney to prepare a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order, to surrender an insurance check for a Cadillac 
car and a stipulation was entered that Mary Page would not be paying the second 
mortgage. Although Ellery surrendered the insurance check for the Cadillac that day, 
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he had held the check until it had expired before he provided it to Mary Page (TR PG 
141 fl5). 
In addition, on September 24, 2009, Ellery's attorney Jay Kessler affirmed that 
he would be providing the QDRO concerning Ellery's retirement account to Mary 
Page. (TR 245 PG 3 LN 24- PG 4 LN 6). To this date, Ellery has never provided the 
QDRO to Mary Page. 
Contra to Ellery's assertion that there is no evidence to marshal, the court's 
post trial Memorandum Decision provides detailed findings concerning the various 
incidents of Ellery's refusal to abide the district court's orders (TR PG 25- PG 24). 
To this day, Ellery Summer has never reinstated Mary Page's medical 
insurance, he has never paid a dime of the medical bills she incurred after he 
terminated her insurance, he has paid no portion of the attorney's fees she was 
awarded, he has never provided the QDRO or the Quitclaim deed to Mary Page as 
ordered by the trial court, and he has never paid any amount towards the $1,000.00 
fine imposed upon him by the trial court both in February 2009 and again on 
September8, 2010. 
For more than three years, Ellery Summer has simply refused to comply with 
the orders of the trial court and yet he appears before this Court claiming he should 
not have been held in contempt by that court any time. 
In his appeal, Ellery Summer has neither marshaled the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous, 
stating only". . . There is nothing to marshal regarding that point" 
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Accordingly, this Court should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
district court and assume that the factual findings are sufficiently supported by the 
evidence presented at trial. Ellery's complete failure to marshal the evidence when 
challenging the trial court's findings must be fatal to his appeal. 
I I . THE DIVISION OF THE MARTIAL ESTATE WAS EQUITABLE 
The trial court made detailed findings in its memorandum decision that fully 
supported the ruling that Mary Page was clearly in need of spousal support and 
entitled to an alimony award, but because Ellery had only a limited retirement income 
that had already been divided between him and Mary Page after their separation, 
there was no money available for an alimony award, leaving only the division of the 
marital property to provide for the two parties' needs and to allow them to pursue their 
separate lives (TR PG 22). 
In his Issues for Review, and in his Standard of Review, Ellery indicates that he 
is challenging the adequacy of the trial court's findings of fact as well as the sufficiency 
of the evidence used by the trial court to support its findings concerning the division of 
marital property and the award of attorney's fees to Mary Page Summer. 
Concerning challenges to a trial court's findings of fact, the Advisory Committee 
Notes to Utah to Rule 24 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure states: 
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re 
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 
1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate 
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'" 
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ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 
1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). 
To reverse the trial courts' award of the marital property, Ellery has the burden 
of compiling every scrap of competent evidence introduced during the trial which 
supports the property award and then, using that evidence, he must convince this 
Court that the trial court abused its very broad discretion in making that property award 
to Mary Page. 
Although in his brief, Ellery cited to Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 
I I , |T 29, 176 P.3d 476, in his un-marshaled argument to support his proposition that 
here, in the trial court's findings, a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion exists 
because Mary Page was awarded his portion of the equity in the marital home in lieu 
of alimony payments. That argument completely ignores the very detailed findings of 
the trial court which gave a comprehensive analysis of the parties' existing financial 
condition and the justification for the property division made (TR PG 23-22). 
Ellery's abuse of the court process to stall or deny for many months Mary 
Page's receipt of her share of the marital property directly led the trial court to award 
Mary Page her attorney's fees. 
I I I . THERE WAS NO ERROR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AGAINST THE PETITIONER 
Mary Page's position is the award of fees was properly made by the trial court 
to allow her, as the prevailing party to collect fees needlessly incurred due to Ellery's 
recalcitrance and his dishonest and evasive conduct giving rise to several 
unnecessary hearings. 
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The award of fees was based on adequate and detailed evidence which Ellery 
never disputed nor challenged at the trial court level and his challenge made to this 
Court was not supported by the marshaling of any credible evidence, thus the award 
of attorney's fees by the trial court should stand as entered. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) is the controlling statute and states in pertinent part: 
"In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees 
upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense." 
Contra to Ellery's arguments, when awarding fees under subsection (2), the 
court "may disregard the financial need of the moving party." Finlayson v. Finlayson, 
874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 
1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree, 
an award of attorney fees is based solely upon the trial court's discretion, regardless 
of the financial need of the moving party.") The guiding factor in fee awards under 
subsection (2) is whether the party seeking an award of fees substantially prevailed on 
the claim. Fee awards under subsection (2) serve no equalizing function but allow the 
moving party to collect fees unnecessarily incurred due to the other party's 
recalcitrance. See Finlayson, 874 P.2d at 850-51. 
In Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921), the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the rationale for awarding attorney fees when one party "refuses to comply 
with the requirements of [an order or] decree" such that the other party "is compelled 
to bring proceedings against" the offending party to ensure compliance with that order. 
Id. at 216. The court explained that the trial court may award reasonable attorney 
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fees to the moving party so that he or she is not forced "to fritter away in costs and 
counsel fees" the amounts received under the order "by bringing repeated actions to 
enforce payment. . . . " Id. 
Further, because Mary Page's attorney submitted an affidavit to the trial court 
describing in detail each of the legal services provided to her and billed at an hourly 
rate which was well below the usual and customary fee for services of this type in this 
location, and because Ellery never disputed the reasonableness of the fees nor 
challenged the court's findings at the time the award was made so that the trial court 
could address the concerns about its findings at the trial court level, the trial court 
would have abused its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested unless 
the reduction was warranted by one or more of the factors described in Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 987-91 (Utah 1988). 
Ellery belatedly challenges the award of fees although once again, he 
completely failed to marshal any of the legions of evidence available to the trial court 
concerning his conduct throughout the 30 months immediately preceding the award, 
whereby he fully earned the right to pay his ex-wife's costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in the several hearings other than the divorce trial, for which she did not 
receive any award of her fees. 
Ellery asks the Court of Appeals to completely overlook an extensive record 
that is heavily laden with incidents of his self-contradictory testimony and outright 
refusal to cooperate with the court process on several issues. Ellery also failed to 
mention to this Court that by his dishonest and evasive resistance to cooperation and 
numerous courtroom outbursts during several hearings, Ellery pushed the trial court to 
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the point of the unusual action of having him handcuffed and taken into the holding 
cell adjacent to the courtroom (TR 243 PG 33 LN 10). 
In this domestic case, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provided the authority for the 
trial court to award Mary Page the costs and attorney fees she incurred upon 
determining that she substantially prevailed upon her multiple claims of Ellery refusing 
to obey the orders of the Court. 
IV. MARY PAGE WAS NOT IN CONTEMPT 
The Utah Legislature has provided statutory contempt authority, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-6-302 (2008), which together with the common law, provides the basis of a 
Utah court's power to hold offenders in contempt. See Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1166-
67. Utah Code section 78B-6-302 provides, 
(1) When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, 
or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily. An order shall be made, reciting 
the facts occurring in the immediate view and presence of the court. The order shall 
state that the person proceeded against is guilty of a contempt and shall be punished 
as prescribed in Section 78B-6-310. 
(2) When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court or judge, an affidavit or statement of the facts by a judicial officer shall be 
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt 
In this matter, Ellery attempts to replace the trial courts' opinion with his own 
concerning the contemptuous nature of Mary Page's various acts. It is clear that the 
determination of a person's contempt before the court is a decision reserved 
exclusively for that court, not to the opposing party. 
Ellery, as the opposing party has no standing whatsoever to raise the issue of 
the contemptuous nature of Mary Page's various acts before the court. 
Therefore, this Court must reject this issue from consideration. 
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Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees Upon Appeal 
"In divorce actions where the trial court has awarded attorney fees and the 
receiving spouse [prevails] on the main issues, we generally award fees on appeal." 
(quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, H 43, 45 P.3d 176), Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, U 11, 176 P.3d 476 (alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
This appeal was not well taken for good cause and has directly caused Mary 
Paige to accumulate significant additional attorney's fees and costs that will equal or 
exceed the fees she was forced to incur in the trial court. Therefore, Mary Paige 
hereby explicitly and respectfully requests that she be allowed to recover the 
attorney's fees incurred on appeal in an amount to be determined by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's dishonest and evasive actions in court during several court 
hearings, his multiple incidents of contempt, his continuous stalling tactics and now his 
decisively inadequate appellate brief have all combined to cause his ex-wife of 28 
years a great injustice. 
Ellery completely failed to marshal the evidence in his appellant's brief as 
required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
In responding to Ellery's appeal, Mary Paige was forced to incur substantial 
additional attorney's fees in addition to those properly awarded to her by the trial court. 
Mary Paige has prevailed on the issues presented to the trial court and 
assuming with good cause that she will prevail on this appeal, Mary Paige Summer 
has asked this Court to award her the fees she has incurred herein. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON THIS September ^ , 2011. 
yfM.—-
Gary Buhler 
Attorney for Mary Paige Summer, Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this IX day of September 2011, I served 2 copies 
and a PDF disk of the forgoing document, by depositing a true and correct copy 
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Jay Kessler 
9087 West 2700 South Suite 9 
Magna UT 84044 ^ , 
Gary Buhler 
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